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1 Introduction 
There seems to be general agreement on that debt reduction would benefit 
both creditor and debtor nations. In the absence of an international debt 
facility that would restructure the highly indebted country's debt, market-
based schemes assume particular importance. Such schemes include straight 
debt repurchases, exit-bonds (which are a form of debt repurchases in which 
future resources are used currently to buyback debt), and debt-equity swaps 
(these can be thought of as equivalent to the following two-step procedure: 
first, allowing private direct investment investment to take place at the mar-
ket exchange rate in a conventional way; second, using those proceeds to buy 
back the coutry's debt 1). In a buyback operation, a debtor buys its own debt 
in secondary markets, taking advantage of the discount it is sold at. There 
is a vast literature on the subject of debt repurchases and much controversy 
has surrounded this topic. Many arguments for and against buybacks have 
been raised by several authors. 
The aim of this paper is to build a general model of debt repurchases which 
incorporates the different arguments raised in the literature, and provides a 
framework which allows for the reconciliation of the different results that 
can be found. This model is then used to show how each previous result is 
dependent on particular assumptions made on the parameters of the model. 
It also points out that the consideration of alternative assets in which the 
country can apply its initial endowment is not of negligeable importance. 
The introduction of the possibility that a debtor country may hold other 
assets safer than investment is precisely what leads to the main conclusions 
of this paper, and to the reversal of some previous results. It is shown that if 
a debtor country holds part of its initial endowment in a safe asset, then: (i) 
The source of the funds used for a buyback brings no qualitatively different 
results, as has previously been suggested. (ii) Investment necessarily rises 
following a buyback. (iii) present consumption does not have to fall following 
a buyback. FinaUy, the condition that determines whether or not a buyback 
will be in the interest of a debtor country is derived. 
In section 2 a review of the debt overhang problem is conducted. For 
readers already familiar with the problem it is recommended to proceed di-
rectly to section 3. In section 3, a brief review of the literature on buybacks 
is presented. In section 4 a general model of debt repurchases is built, and 
the condition that determines whether or not a buyback is in the interest of 
Ithis is true unless we are in the presence of a few particular cases, as noted by 
Williamson (1988): (1) in the case where the country is not allowed to buyback its own 
debt (2) in the case where the inflow of foreign exchange would otherwise be preempted for 
debt service (3) if the country wishes to subsidize at least some forms of inward investment. 
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the debtor nation is derived. In section 5 it is shown that some of the con-
clusions previously found in the literature can be weakened or even reversed 
under the more general conditions of the model developed in section 4. It is 
shown that, if the debtor country has the choice of holding a safe asset, then 
the source of the resources a country uses to buy back its own debt brings 
no qualitatively different results, as had been previously suggested. Invest-
ment will necessarily rise, irrespective of the resources used being current 
resources or future resources (exit bonds). Current consumption will not fall 
as a result either, as has been often said. If the debtor country holds any 
asset less risky than investment, it will choose to hold less of that asset and 
invest more once debt levels are reduced. If the country holds a completely 
risk-free asset then optimal holdings of that asset fall by the amount used for 
the buyback plus the amount used for the additional investment that would 
result. But current consumption remains uncanged. Section 6 concludes. 
The debt overhang problem 
In the early 80s, a series of negative shocks in the international economy. In 
1982 Mexico decla.red that it could no longer continue to service its interna-
tional credit obligations. For the first time, the possibility that some of the 
world's largest debtors might default on their international loans arised. 
It was at first believed that the debt servicing problems that had then 
begun to surface were due to short-term liquidity problems and that as soon 
as economic recovery in many of the problem debtors resumed, debt servicing 
would continue. Therefore, with appropriate debt rescheduling negotiations, 
debt payments could be eased in the present, while the "liquidity crisis" 
lasted, but debt payments would resume in the future. This view reflected 
the belief that most countries will be solvent in the long run and that the 
problem was one of iliquidity. If the surplus available for debt service (the 
balance of goods, services and transfers plus inflows of direct and official 
investment minus the service of senior debt) grows faster than the rate of 
interest then a country can service its debt provided that it is given some 
liquidity relief. Many of the supporters of this view argue that if repayment 
has continued to take place in any scale at all, it is because debtors wish to 
continue to "play by the rules" so that they can regain access to international 
credit markets in the future. If only partial repayment takes place, this looks 
just as bad in the debtor's "record" as default. Any debt reduction schemes 
would make it more difficult for debtors to borrow in the future therefore 
erasing the benefits debtors have been hoping for with the repayment effort 
maintained until now. By very simply pushing the burden of the debt into 
the future, one would allow countries who want to continue to play by the 
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rules to be able to do so given the liquidity difficulties they face in the short-
run, without jeopardizing their reputation in international credit markets. 
But several years after the first problems began to surface the economic 
conditions continue to deteriorate; debt/export ratios, whose high values 
were associated with the triggering of the debt crisis, have remained high; 
commodity prices have also remained low for longer than it had been an-
ticipated and world interest rates have remained steadily high. The high 
debt servicing burden that has resulted from these now long lasting adverse 
conditions has continued to divert savings from needed investment. 
The large debt overhang not only creates adverse economic incentives but 
also adverse political incentives that work against any prospects of continued 
future servicing by most debtor nations. Prospects of solving the debt crisis 
seem gloomier now than ever, as it is clearly shown by the large discounts 
that claims to Latin American debt are traded at in secondary markets. They 
reflect the growing fear that creditors might never be repaid. 
The long maintained view that debt servicing would be able to continue in 
the "medium-run" has now been subject to much criticism. Other proposals 
on the resolution of the current crisis are centered around debt reduction 
schemes. In 1989 Secretary Brady officially advocated for the first time debt 
forgiveness as a way os easing the debt urden in the LDCs and restoring 
their economic growth. The idea is that debt levels are too high to service 
with current resources and that therefore they should be reduced. High debt 
levels act as a tax on investment, thus penalizing economic growth. Debt 
reduction would ease the debt servicing burden in the short-run without 
however increasing payments due in the future, unlike the currently followed 
"debt financing" approach. The arguments for debt reduction are clearly 
described by Krugman (1988): 
When a country's obligations exceed the amount it is likely to be able to 
pay, these obligations act like a high marginal tax rate on the country: if it 
succeeds in doing better than expected, the main benefits will accrue, not to 
the country, but to its creditors. This fact discourages the country from doing 
well at two levels. First, the government of a country will be less likely to take 
2With the concern of relating debt servicing payments to the "ability to pay" of these 
economies, other ideas developed. One proposal was that debt service payments should 
be limited to a certain percentage of exports, in order to guarantee that enough resources 
are available for the much needed investment in these economies. These proposals have 
been criticized (see Bergsten, eline and Williamson, 1985) with the argument that this 
would constitute a strong disincentive to the development of export industries, and create 
a distortion that would act like an tax on exports. 
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painful or politically unpalatable measures to improve economic performance 
if the benefits are likely to go to foreign creditors in any case. Second, the 
burden of the national debt will fall on domestic residents through taxation, 
and importantly through taxation of capital; so the overhang of debt acts as 
a deterrent to investment. (... ) the higher is the external debt of a country, 
the larger the probability of nonpayment; and thus the greater the subjective 
discount on that debt. If debt is high enough, further increases in the level of 
debt may actually lead to a smaller expected value of payments 
The idea that creditors may sometimes increase expected payment by 
forgiving part of a country's debt is similar to that of the tax Laffer curve 
and has been consequently been called the Debt Relief Laffer Curve 3. Debt 
reduction should contribute to more investment incentives and lead to eco-
nomic reform. If debt reduction warrants enough growth, the secondary 
market value of debt will increase. It is then possible that this gain would 
make up for any losses incurred by banks in the debt reduction process. The 
better the economic performance of the debtors the smaller the expected 
losses for creditor banks, if any 4. 
There are several different ways in which a reduction in debt levels can be 
achieved: Considerable attention has been given to various proposals for an 
international debt facility, an agency that would restructure highly indebted 
country's debt. Its purpose would be to provide debt relief to debtor countries 
through debt reduction schemes, while assuring that debtors benefiting from 
this type of action would pursue an internationally supervised program of 
economic reform. 
While the creation of the International Debt Facility is widely discussed 
and debated 5, few debt reduction schemes have been put in practice. The 
3Sachs (1988) originally referred to this effect as the "Debt Laffer curve". Schwartz 
and Zurita (1992) provide an example in which they construct such a curve, and how it 
can be used to determine the optimal debt level to be reached (through negociation) 
4Concerns about the secondary market value of debt should not be viewed as all that 
critical. As noted by Sachs (1988), even in the event that losses would result to creditor 
banks on their international loans value, this does not necessarily mean that the market 
value of lending banks would have to fall. Bank's share prices are already discounted given 
the current expectations of future losses on these loans. Large amounts of reserves have 
also been set aside for the eventuality of large-scale defaults by debtor nations. 
5The U.5. Treasury has strongly opposed the creation of such an institution. Arguments 
used against it rest on the concern that it would cost the taxpayers too much money and 
that public funds would have to be used to bail out banks suffering large losses from 
this type of scheme. However, while this might be true if one assumes that all debt 
will eventually be repaid in the future under the current strategy, it is not necessarily so 
otherwise. With the current handling of the debt crisis situation, exposure of commercial 
banks has steadily declined while exposure of many international institutions and of export 
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main reason is certainly a collective action problem: individual banks don't 
want to participate in such schemes since remaining debt becomes safer and 
increases in value. It is in creditors interest that debt be reduced, but it is 
not in any individual's bank interest to forgive or sell at secondary market 
prices its own debt claims. It is financially more rewarding to hold on to them 
since they increase in value subsequently. If creditors have in the past been 
unable to overcome the free-rider problem that has crippled the new lending 
required to sustain continued investment (and debt servicing), certainly the 
same type of difficulty will also arise with debt reduction schemes and block 
any coordinated write-down of debt. 
In the absence an international debt facility that would help override 
this problem, an alternative is market-based debt reduction schemes such as 
debt/equity swaps, buybacks and exit bonds. These schemes' voluntary base 
would allow the overcoming of the free-rider problem. 
Debt/equity swaps have been implemented in a number of countries (in-
cluding Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and the Philippines). 
With a debt/equity swap, a foreign investor buys some of a country's debt 
on the secondary market and then trades it in at the central bank for local 
currency. This currency is then used for the purpose of investment 6. 
Another form of market based debt reduction schemes is debt buybacks. 
In a buyback operation, the debtor country buys its own debt in the sec-
ondary market from its current holders, using either own resources or inter-
nationally donated funds 7. 
Similar to debt buybacks there is the case of exit bonds. Exit bonds 
consist on swapping a certain amount of debt for bonds where there is some 
concession to the debtor in terms of the interest rate or of the value of the 
credit agencies has increased. Therefore, tax dollars are already being used to support 
interest payments to commercial banks. With a debt reduction plan, initial book losses 
would be absorbed by commercial banks rather than taxpayers. 
6As noted by Bulow & Rogoff (1988) equivalent to a debt-equity swap is the following 
two-step operation: first, allowing direct private investment to take place in the economy at 
the market exchange rate in a conventional way. Second, using those proceeds to buyback 
the country's debt. 
7In the absence of concerted action, in order for creditors to be willing to selJ their 
claims the price offered has to be high enough so that creditors will be indifferent between 
selling or holding on to their claims. Therefore, the price at which a buyback could take 
place would have to be at least as high as the post-buyback expected market price of 
remaining debt. If the buyback took place at a lower price than this, we would again be 
in the presence of a free rider problem. All debt holders would want the buyback to take 
place since it is expected to raise the value of remaining debt. But no one wants to be the 
one selling since after the buyback the value of their claims would have increased. This is 
true unless the banks have different reservation prices. 
6 
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bond issue 8. Exit bonds can be thus described as a buyback operation using 
"future" resources. 
The literature on debt buybacks 
A great amount of controversy has surrounded the subject of debt buybacks, 
and many arguments have been raised in the literature for and against them. 
The main of these points will next be reviewed: 
(1) Secondary market prices are too high: In Bulow and Rogoff (1988) 
the argument used against debt buybacks is that the price which debtors 
must pay to buy back debt is too high. In order for creditors to be willing 
to sell, the price must be at least the "average" value of debt, while the 
reduction in debt payments is given by the "marginal" value of debt Suppose 
a country's debt is D, and that with probability 1r it will fully repay its debt. 
Otherwise it will default. Suppose further that in case of default the creditor 
is able to exctract some repayment x :::; D. The average value of debt is thus 
1r +(1 - 1r)x / D. This represents how much on average creditors are expected 
to be paid on each unit of debt. The marginal value of debt represents the 
reduction in total debt payments if the face value of debt is reduced by one 
unit: [1r D + (1 - 1r )x] - [1r(D - 1) + (1 - 1r )x] = 1r. The average value of 
debt would thus be larger than the marginal value of debt. The difference 
between the two values depends on how much the creditor expects to be able 
to recover from the debtor country's disposable income in the event of default 
and on how large the probability of default is. They argue that the excess 
of the average value of debt over the marginal value of debt is likely to be 
great. 
Their argument against buybacks is strengthened by the fact that the 
price that must be paid in order to induce creditors to sell is not the pre-
buyback but the post-buybach (higher) average value of debt 9 (See also 
SIn order for creditors to agree to these concessions these bonds have to be "safer" 
than the original debt, so that some sort of guarantees on the principal or on interest 
may be required. Alternatively, the principal or interest on the bonds could be made 
senior to those on existing loans. Partial or total coJlateralization could also be a solution. 
Collateralization using reserves seems pointless since reserves could be used as or more 
efficiently in a buyback program. Seniority does not seem to be a viable solution either 
since the required waiver of the nonsubordination clause would need the unanimous consent 
of all lending banks, which is highly unlikely. Therefore the only other possibility is that 
of guarantees which would have to be provided by an institution such as the World Bank, 
who has the legal power, capital, experience and capacity to do so. 
9In the absence of concerted action, in order for creditors to be willing to sell their 
7 
Dooley(1988)). 
They further argue that since the creditors are better-off with than with-
out the buyback, which is "a purely financial transaction with no efficiency 
gains or losses", the debtor country must end up worse off. Debt buybacks 
would thus not be an attractive solution to a debtor country per se and 
they thus don't make sense, unless the debtor also receives incremental new 
loans and donations to cover part of their losses, or else receive some other 
kind of substantial concessions from the creditor. They argue that in a buy-
back operation the country is using funds that the creditor would otherwise 
be unable to apprehend, and that these funds could otherwise be used for 
consumption or investment. 
(2) The insurance value of reserves: Another argument against buy-
backs is raised by Van Wijnbergen (1991). He argues that using reserves to 
buy-back debt can only lead to a reduction in welfare, even if the secondary 
market price the country is able to buy its own debt at is as low as the 
marginal value of debt 10, because reserves have an insurance value to the 
debtor country. This value is not captured by the secondary market price 
which only reflects intra-bank transactions 11. 
(3) The investment incentive constraint: The main argument in favor 
of debt buybacks is the fact that high debt values introduce a disincentive 
to investment, since part of the fruits of investment would be used for debt 
repayment. Investors perceive a reduction in debt levels as an increase in the 
expected return in investment projects. A reduction in debt levels therefore 
results in more investment taking place, and could actually increase future 
debt payments by highly indebted countries. Krugman (1988) provides a 
clear description of this effect, which is later formally built into an analytic 
framework and modelled in Froot (1989). Froot formulates a general model 
with investment incentives. This model is used to compare four different 
debt reduction schemes: pure debt forgiveness, debt buybacks out of inter-
claims the price offered has to be high enough so that creditors will be indifferent between 
selling or holding on to their claims. Therefore, the price at which a buyback could take 
place would have to be at least as high as the post-buyback expected market price of 
remaining debt. If the buyback took place at a lower price than this, we would again be 
in the presence of a free rider problem. All debt holders would want the buyback to take 
place since it is expected to raise the value of remaining debt. But no one wants to be the 
one selling since after the buyback the value of their claims would have increased. This is 
true unless the banks have different reservation prices. 
IOThis would be the case where the creditors would receive nothing in the states of 
default. Otherwise the secondary market price (which reflects the average value of debt) 
would be larger than the marginal value. 
11 Van Wijnbergen's result is obtained under the assumption that reserves are a perfectly 
safe asset. It can easily be shown that the violation of this assumption will lead to the 
definition of conditions under which buybacks will not be welfare reducing. 
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nationally donated funds, debt buybacks out of first period endowment and 
exit bonds (buybacks out of future cash flows). Results depend largely on 
the source of resources used to buyback debt since they have different op-
portunity costs. In all schemes with the exception of buybacks out of first 
period resources, funds become available in the same period in which they are 
used. However, if first period endowments are used to buyback debt, this is 
not true. It results in an intertemporal substitution effect which contributes 
to reduce investment and can even offset the investment incentive effect. In 
this case investment would actually fall, if first period utility is sufficiently 
concave. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1991) construct a model that includes investment 
incentives and derive a necessary condition for a buyback to be in the interest 
of a debtor country. This condition is shown not to depend on parameters 
which are independent on the responsiveness of Investment to debt reduction. 
They thus argue that it is true that buybacks can stimulate investment, but 
when they do, it is the creditors who reap the efficiency gains, leading them 
to conclude that the inclusion of investment incentive effect does not alter 
the conclusions of their fixed investment 1988 model. 
(4) The intersector investment distorsion effect: Using a two-sector 
model, where only one of the sectors is exposed to output expropriation in 
case of default 12, Goldberg and Spiegel (1992) show that a large debt over-
hang distorts the allocation of investment between the two sectors. A debt 
buyback would then serve to alter this allocation of investment producing 
efficiency gains. In this case, it also follows that a capital gain would accrue 
to the owners of old equity in the "safe" sector. The presence of this capital 
gain leads them to conclude that debt/ ("safe" sector) equity swaps may be 
desirable even when straight buybacks are not. It also raises distributional 
considerations: If there is some factors complementary to investment, such 
as labor, would benefit from the presence of the distorted investment allo-
cation in the safe sector. It follows that when debt levels are reduced, they 
loose part of those benefits. Clearly then, in the absence of a redistribution 
of wealth, pure debt forgiveness is in the interest of some agents but not 
in the interest of others. They argue that such distributional considerations 
may hinder the realization of debt reduction schemes which increase national 
wealth as a whole. 
12the "safe sector" would comprise domestic goods production, cottage industries, etc. 
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4 A general model of debt buybacks 
A model is set up in subsection 4.1 in which a central planner allocates 
initial country endowment between two assets: one is investment and the 
other is any other asset. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we 
will assume that this asset is international currency reserves. The central 
planner is assumed to maximize expected utility of the representative agent. 
In subsection 4.2 this model is used to see if added welfare is possible through 
a debt buyback. 
4.1 The model 
A two-period model is used. The debtor country derives utility from con-
sumption in periods 1 and 2. The utility function is assumed to be addi-
tively time separable and to increase in consumption at a decreasing rate 
(i.e. V: > 0, Vi' < 0, i = 1,2). The debtor's discount factor is f3 < 1. The 
country's endowment is Yi. The level of inherited debt is Dj(1 + r*), where 
r* is the periodic external interest rate. D units of debt are due to be paid 
in period 2. In period one, the initial endowment Yi is allocated between 
present consumption (C), investment (1) and holdings of foreign currency 
reserves (R). Investment yields a return of 1(1) +c units of output in period 
2, with 1'(1) > 0, 1" (1) < 0; c is a random variable defined in the interval 
[~, t] which follows a density function defined by g(c). Reserves earn the risk 
free interest rate rJ. In period 2, the country observes the realization of the 
random variable c and decides either to make payment on the outstanding 
obligations D and consume whatever second period income remains, or to 
default knowing that this decision involves some losses imposed by creditors. 
These losses can be viewed as losses of gains from trade, losses associated 
with the exclusion of international financial markets, the loss of trade cred-
its, etc. We will assume that they proportional to the country's output and 
reserves levels (a fraction qi of output qr of reserves, for example) 13. In de-
ciding whether or not to default, the debtor country compares utility under 
default and no default conditions, and since its objective is to maximize util-
ity, it will choose the alternative that will provide higher utility 14. Therefore, 
13Losses associated with the deterioration of the terms of trade for example would result 
in a percentage reduction in output levels. Making the default loss dependent on the level 
of reserves can be rationalized as follows: creditors might take tougher action against 
countries that hold high foreign currency reserve levels and yet default on their loans. 
How "tough" creditors are could be viewed as associated not only with the country's 
output level but with the country's disposable income instead. 
HAs shown in Bulow and Rogoff (1988) and Rosenthal (1991) a sovereign desire for 
future access to international credit. markets, which it retains by paying its international 
10 
for the observed realization of c repayment will take place if second period 
disposable income net of debt repayment is less than net of default losses 
(resulting from creditor retaliation): 
From this condition, one can derive the "critical" value for c, c = co which 
makes the debtor country indifferent between repayment of debt and default: 
(1) 
When c assumes a value larger than co, repayment will result; otherwise the 
country chooses to default. The probability of repayment (7r) is then defined 
as: 
7r = if g(c)dc (2)
Co 
The country's objective is to maximize expected utility, with respect to 
reserves holdings and investment: 
i CO max E[U] = U(Y1 -R-I)+/3 U[(1-qj)(J(I)+c)+(1-qr )(1+rj )R]g(c)dc {R;!} !. 
+/31~ U[J(I) +c +(1 +rj)R - D]g(c)dc (3) 
The first order conditions for this maximization problem are: 
cOd~~] = -U; +/3{i U~(1- qr)g(c)dc +1:U~g(c)dc}(1 +r/) = 0 (4) 
_dE_[U_] = -u; + /3{jCOU~(1- qj)g(c)dc + jCO U~g(c)dc)}J'(I) = 0 (5)
dI !. !. 
These expressions can be combined to obtain: 
The expected rate of return on investment will equal the rate of return on 
the alternative asset: reserves. Optimal investment is thus determined by the 
risk free rate ofreturn (rj, the return on reserves), the percentage reduction in 
output and in reserves that results in case of default (qi and qr respectively), 
debts, does not constitute by itself enough of an incentive for full repayment. 
11 
and on the probability of default itself (i.e. on co). Investment will be lower 
the higher the risk free interest rate rj, the higher the percentage reduction 
in output that results in case of default (qi) and the lower the percentage loss 
in reserves (qr). 
A reduction in the level of debt results in a lower probability of default, 
resulting from a reduction in co as can be seen from definition (1). From ex-
amination of (6) it then becomes clear that investment levels will necessarily 
rise as long as qi > qr, i.e. as long as the other asset the debtor country holds 
(in this case reserves) is "safer" than investment. 
4.2 Will a debt buyback be welfare improving? 
Can a buyback be welfare improving from the debtor country's point of view? 
Under what conditions? Suppose the buyback reduces second period debt by 
X units (remaining debt will be D-X) and that the price the country must 
pay for the buyback is P. We will look at the sign of d~<.f) evaluated at 
X = 0 (i.e. at the current debt level), where V(X) measures expected utility 
resulting from the lower debt level D - X. 
V(X) = U(Y1 - I - R - P 1 X )+r* 
+(3 i~h U[(l - qj)(f(I) + c) + (1 - qr)(l + rJ)R]g(c)dc 
+1~ U[j(I) + c + (1 + rJ)R - D + X]g(c)dc (7) 
o 
where 
, D - X qr ( ) f() ( ) co= --l+rJ R- I 8 
qj qi 
represents the post buyback critical value for the random shock variable 
(which defines the new probability of repayment 1l") and where I and R 
represent the new optimal levels of reserves and of investment given the 
resulting lower level of debt due in period 2. A debt buyback will be welfare 
improving if, 
dV(X) Ix 0 = -U1' P + /3iE U2' g(c)dc ~ 0 (9)dX = 1+r* ~b 
Using (4) this condition can be rewritten as 
f~~ U~g(c )dc 1 + r* p< 0 (10) 
- f:
_ 
hU2(1 - qr)g(c)dc + f~~0 U2g(c)dc 1 + rJ 
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The price at which the buyback takes place (P) has to be (at least) equal to 
the post-buyback market price of debt. In order to determine how high P 
will be, one needs further assumptions: Let us assume that if default occurs 
in the second period, the creditor is able to apprehend a fraction q: of output 
and a fraction q~ of reserves. This fraction q: has to be smaller than or 
equal to qi 15, Similarly, qr ~ q~. The average value of each unit of debt 
is the expected value of repayment plus the expected value of apprehended 
output and reserves in the states of default, divided by the total amount of 
outstanding debt (D - X). Let V(D) denote the average value of debt in 
t=2. 
f~~~[qHf(I) +c) + q~(1 +rJ)R]g(e)de + 1r'(D - X)
V(D - X) = D _ X (11) 
which can be rewritten as: 
v(D - X) = D ~ X + 1r' (12) 
where Q represents the expected value of apprehended output in the default 
states 16: 
(13) 
The average value of debt in t = 1 will thus be V(D - X)/(l + rJ). This is 
the price the country will have to pay to buy back its own debt. 
From (10), we can then say that the buyback will be welfare improving if 
rl U'g(e)de 
, Q hb 2 (1 + OO) (14)7r+ r<' _ r 
D - X f~~o U~(1- qr)g(e)de + f~~ U~g(e)de 
- 0 
This condition can be interpreted in the following way: Welfare will in-
crease with a buyback if the marginal utility of the amount of savings in 
gross interest payments to creditors in the debt bought u~~ U~g(e )de(1 + rOO) 
is higher than the marginal utility of the lost profitability of the resources 
used to buy it back (PU:oU~(1-qr)g(e)de+ f:C U~g(e)de)). The attractive-
ness of the buyback from the point of view of the debtor country depends 
largely upon the value of the parameters in the model; namely it depends 
on how safe reserves are (qr), on the difference between the average and the 
15i,e the losses to the debtor in terms of output are larger than what the creditor receives 
if there are some inefficiency losses, or they would be equal if there are no such losses; but 
clearly under no circumstances can the creditor physically apprehend more than what is 
lost by the debtor in case of default. 
16 ~ represents difference between the average and the marginal value of debt 
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marginal value of debt o:j(D -X) and on the concavity of the utility function 
(i.e. the degree of risk aversion) 17. 
let us take for instance the case where qr = 0 (reserves are perfectly 
"safe") and U~ = 1 (utility is linear in second period consumption). Then, 
this expression becomes: 
, 0: 0: 
7r + D _ X :5 7r'(1 + r") or -=:-----::":' :5 1r'r"D-X 
Welfare can increase with a buyback that reduces second period debt by one 
unit if the interest saved in the repayment states is larger than (or equal 
to) the "excess payment" on debt repurchased (the difference between the 
average and the marginal value of debt). 
Reconciling the results in the literature 
In this section we will see how the formulation of specific assumptions on the 
parameters of the general model set up in section 4 can lead to the different 
results which can be found throughout the literature. 
One of the cases studied by Bulow and Rogoff (1988) is the one where 
in the event of default the creditor is able to "apprehend" a fraction q of 
the defaulting country's disposable income (output and reserves). In terms 
of our general model this means setting qi = qr = q. It becomes clear, from 
examination of (6) that if such assumption is made, optimal investment will 
be determined by 
J'(I) = (1 + rf) 
Therefore, no investment incentive effects would be present. The fact that 
any possible incentive effects due to a buybackare ignored is clearly shown 
when they argue: the repurchase is a purely financial transaction with no 
efficiency gains . .. 
They also point out that the larger q the more likely it will be that the 
buyback will be welfare improving. They state that if we had q = 1 (which 
they call the "corporation case") it would be an attractive operation. In fact, 
examination of condition (10) confirms this result. If q = 1 this conditions 
reduces to P < ~$;; ,and a debt buyback will always be welfare improving 
17If the buyback is done out of internationally donated funds, from the debtor country's 
point of view that is equivalent to simple debt forgiveness; in terms of our model, the coun-
try would simply view P as P =0 in the model formulated above. Therefore the buyback 
would necessarily be welfare improving and higher levels of first period consumption and 
investment would result. 
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since P < 1 and r* ~ rf (i.e., the external interest rate is always greater 
than or equal to the risk free rate of return). Therefore, the larger the value 
of q, the more attractive the buyback will be to the debtor. 
Additionally, they assume that every dollar lost by debtors due to the 
imposition of default penalties would be a dollar gained by the creditors. In 
terms of the general model this meansthat qi = q~ =q and qr = q; =q. This 
is an extreme assumption which yields the largest possible difference between 
the marginal and the average value of debt would be so large. It sets the 
values of q: and q~ at its upper bound and therefore results in the maximum 
possible value for Q in our model (see expressions (12) and (13)). However, 
many of the losses that debtor countries are expected to suffer in the event 
of default might not represent a gain to creditors either. Examples of such 
losses would be losses of the gains from trade, losses of trade credits, etc. It 
seems that it would be more reasonable to assume qi > q: and qr > q~, which 
would result in a weaker condition than the one they obtain. 
In Van \Vijnbergen's model, in case of default output is reduced by some 
percentage qi and reserves are a perfectly safe asset. It can be shown that if 
the default penalty is in any way dependant on the foreign currency levels 
(e.g. if we assume qr =f. 0) the result that Welfare will necessarily decrease 
following a buyback operation with the use of foreign currency reserves will 
no longer hold at all times even in the absence of investment incentive effects. 
It is easily shown that a debt buyback can be welfare improving under certain 
condition, and that results depend on the degree of risk aversion and on how 
safe reserves are, i.e. the parameter qr' 
The "gunboat technology" assumption made by Froot (the entire debtor's 
country output can be confiscated by creditors in case of default) is, in terms 
of the general model, equivalent to setting qi = q: = 1. It is also assumed 
that the only asset the country can apply it's first period endowment on is 
investment. Reserves holdings are exogenous and utility is linear in second 
period consumption. Remaining assumptions are similar to the ones in the 
general model described above. Under these assumptions the investment 
optimality condition (6) becomes: 
u; = (31r1'(/) 
This is the precisely condition obtained by Froot. From it a substantial 
qualitative difference between buybacks out of first period endowment and 
buybacks out of future endowment results, as explained in section 3 18. In 
18 Using first period endowment funds to buyback debt reduces first period consumption, 
which works to increase V{ and lead to a decrease in the investment level (which could 
offset the increase in investment resulting from the reduction in the investment incentive 
distortion) . 
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the following section it will be seen how Froot's results can be substantially 
altered if we allow the country to hold an alternative asset in which to apply 
some of it's first period's endowments. 
In Goldberg and Spiegel, the country's first period endowment is either 
consumed or invested in one of two prductive activities. One of this pro-
ductive activities is subject to creditor "apprehension" in case the country 
defaults on its loans (investment in this sector is denoted by /a and qi = qa) 
and the other is "safe" from apprehension (In denotes investment in this 
sector and qn = 0). There is no other way the country can transform first pe-
riod endowment into second period consumption. Utility is linear in second 
period consumption (U~ = 1) If the general model is altered to include one 
more productive activity, and to exclude asset R, the optimality condition 
that would result would precisely be the one they obtain: 
7r j' (/a) = j'(/n) 
The large debt overhang introduces a distorsion which results in less than 
otherwise optimal investment in the seizable sector and more than optimal in-
vestment in the non-seizable sector. It follows that if debt is reduced (through 
debt forgiveness or repurchases), investment increases in the seizable sector 
and falls in the non-seizable sector, thus increasing the marginal product of 
capital in the "safe sector" and creating capital gains in this sector. For 
this reason they conclude that debt-equity swaps may be in the interest of 
debtors even when straight debt repurchases are not. This result is expressed 
in Proposition 3 of their paper. 
In the next section we will reexamine this conclusion under the more 
general assumptions of our model. 
The hnportance of alternative assets to in-
vestment 
In this section I will show that the difference between buybacks out of current 
resources or future resources will no longer remain as strong (or it may even 
not be present at all) as Froot has suggested, as long as the country has 
the choice of holding other (safer) assets. Foreign currency reserves can be 
an example of such an asset. I will also show that Goldberg and Spiegel's 
proposition 3 will no longer hold in the presence of such other assets. 
Let us first consider the case where there is only one productive activity, 
as in Froot, and assume that the debtor country can also convert first period 
endowment into second period consumption by holding an asset R. Suppose 
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that utility is linear in second period consumption, and that in case of default 
the creditor is able to apprehend all of the debtor's output. These are the 
same assumptions as in Froot (1989) with the exception of the presence of the 
extra asset. Using (6) and setting u~ = 1, qi = 1, the first order conditions 
are: 
-u; + ;3{i~o (1 - qr)(1 + rJ)g(c)dc +1:(1 + rJ)g(c)dc} = 0 (15) 
-U; +;3it 1'(I)g(c)dc = 0 (16) 
~o 
As pointed out by Froot, the second first order condition shows that the 
discounted expected marginal return on investment will equal first period 
marginal utility. But from examination of (17) it can be seen that now it 
will also equal the expected return on reserves (net of default losses). This 
allows us to write 
Equiation (17) demonstrates that optimal investment is determined by the 
condition that the expected return on investment equal the expected return 
on reserves. It also shows that if debt levels are reduced, as in the case of a 
buyback, investment will necessarily increase as long as asset R is safer than 
investment: qr < 1. This result holds no matter what the source of the funds 
used for the buyback is. In Froot's model Investment could fall if first period 
endowment was used for the buyback. We see that now that can no longer 
happen. 
It can also be seen that investment response to a lower debt level depends 
on how safe reserves are. If for example qr = 1 (the case where reserves are 
subject to apprehension in the states of default) then there would be no 
investment incentive effects since the condition above would be reduced to 
1'(1) = (1 + rJ) If on the other hand R is a perfectly safe asset (qr = 0) the 
investment response will be at its maximum with 7r1'(1) = (1 + rJ). Since 
a lower debt level increases the probability of repayment it increases the 
expected marginal return on investment (while the return on reserves remains 
constant) and investment necessarily rises. Thus the safer the alternative 
asset, the stronger the investment incentive effect will be. From the first first 
order condition one can also conclude that the presence of a perfectly "safe" 
asset would determine a fixed first period marginal utility (and thus also first 
period consumption) at a level determined by the risk free interest rate and 
the discount rate. It can easily be seen that first order condition (15) would 
become U~ = ;3(1 +rJ). A buyback would no longer have the effect of reducing 
first period consumption, and the intertemporal substitution effect present in 
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Froot's model would therefore vanish. Then, only the investment incentive 
effect would be present, investment would increase with a buyback (with the 
increase in the probability of repayment), and there would therefore be no 
difference between the investment incentive effects with a buyback out of 
current or out of future resources 19. Here, because first period consumption 
is fixed, there is no intertemporal substitution effect; all adjustment is done 
through an adjustment in reserves levels. 
If we totally differentiate the optimality condition 1rf'(I) = (1 + rJ), and 
since ;; = -g(e~) we can then write: 
dI = f'(I) g(eo) dD (18)
1"(/) 1r 
It can easily be seen that investment will necessarily rise with a buyback in 
this case (dI > 0), since there is a reduction in the debt level (dD = -X < 0) 
and since f"(/) < O. Finally, since first period consumption does no longer 
change with the buyback, we can also write dCI = 0 which allows us to 
determine how much optimal reserves holdings change due to the buyback. 
Since 
dC I = dYI - dI - dR = 0 for a buyback out of internationally donated 
funds 
dCI = dYI - dI - dR - [P/(1 + r*)]dD = 0 for a buyback out of the 
country's resources one can then write: 
dR = - f'(/) g(eo) dD (19)f"(I) 1r 
if the buyback is done out of internationally donated funds (the same would 
result from pure debt forgiveness). 
dR = _[ f'(/) g(eo) + P ]dD (20)f"(/) 1r 1 +r-
if the buyback is done out of the debtor country's resources. 
In the case where the buyback is done out of internationally donated 
funds, reserves fall by the same amount of the resulting increase in investment 
(i.e. additional investment is done with funds that would otherwise be held 
as reserves, just because the investment incentive distortion is now smaller 
and Investment now yields a higher return). However, reserves will fall by 
19The presence of the "safe" asset eliminates the intertemporal substitution effect. Of 
course, the presence of an asset which is safer than investment but not perfectly safe (i.e. 
qr > 0) would merely reduce the size of this effect but not make it vanish 
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more with a buyback out of current resources than with a buyback out of 
internationally donated funds or debt forgiveness. The reduction in the level 
of debt due to the buyback out of country's resources produces a new level of 
reserves that is lower that the previously optimal level minus the resources 
needed for the buyback. This result comes from two different effects working 
in the determination of the optimal level of reserves: first, since first period 
consumption is to remain unchanged, as with the buyback some resources 
will be used, this tends to reduce first period consumption and reserves fall 
to partially offset that effect. Second, the increase in investment also reduces 
first period consumption if not offset by a reduction in reserves holdings. 
Therefore, while first period consumption does not fall, more funds are freed 
for investment. 
If there is more than one productive activity, as in Goldberg and Spiegel, 
we will have an additional first order condition (let us denote investment in 
this sector by In, qn = 0: 
(21 ) 
Suppose that qr = 0 once more. Then this expression becomes !'(In) == 
(1 + r J). Investment in the "safe sector" is now no longer affected by debt 
reduction, and the capital gain effect vanishes from the model. Now, the 
large debt overhang only affects the seizable sector's optimal investment just 
as in Froot's model, and no additional effects will be present. It follows that 
debt-equity swaps can be no more desirable than straight debt repurchases, 
thus denying Goldberg and Spiegel's proposition 3. 
Conclusions 
In order to judge on the attractiveness of debt buybacks one has to pay at-
tention to all of the several aspects of the problem involved: on one hand one 
cannot ignore the investment incentive effects generated by such a buyback 
in modeling them; it cannot be forgotten that this was the original argument 
raised in favor of debt reduction schemes. On the other hand one has to be 
aware of arguments such as the insurance value of reserves used for a buy-
back and of the fact that the cost at which the buyback takes place might 
be higher than the reduction in debt's face value. This two latter arguments 
suggest that there are costs to the buyback that mayor may not outweigh 
the benefits. 
It has been shown that the attractiveness of buybacks depends largely 
upon the value of some of the parameters in the general model used. Of 
19 
particular importance is a more clear definition of what the creditor is able 
to apprehend in case of default: should this be modeled as a percentage 
of output, or a percentage of total disposable income? How safe are other 
assets held by debtor nations? The investment incentive effects are largely 
dependent upon this. Also dependent on these parameters is the definition 
of the difference between the average and the marginal value of debt so often 
argued to be a large drawback to this type of operation. Different beliefs on 
these values can lead to very different results. Therefore particular attention 
should be given to them; only defining reasonable estimates for its values 
would then allow to answer the question of whether or not buybacks are 
attractive solutions to the resolution of the debt crisis and settle much of the 
controversy. 
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